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How The Liberal Media Myth is Created
(A series originally published at The
Left Coaster by eRiposte)
SUMMARY
Over the years a number of different approaches have
been used by different individuals and groups (especially those on the
Right) to claim that the "mainstream media" (MSM) in the
United States has a "liberal bias" in its news reporting.
Here, I systematically examine the most prominent of these claims, as
well as other less publicized claims (by breaking them down into
different classes), and show how these claims really do not prove
that there is a "liberal media" bias (overall) in the United States.
The main reason why most of the
"liberal media" claims to-date don't really prove their case
is that such claims don't assess accuracy of the news
content at all. Clearly, establishing the accuracy of the content
is the most challenging part of media bias analysis, which may explain
why critics often attempt to "prove" media bias using other
approaches, e.g., "tone" of media coverage, "catch-phrases"
in articles, "newspaper headlines", "topics"
covered, "think-tank" citations, journalist
ideology or voting preferences, and public opinion polls.
Of these, the only category that comes even remotely close to
addressing a piece of the media bias issue is the aspect of
"topics" covered - but even there, proving bias can be quite
difficult; indeed, I have shown that the one serious study which used
that approach was totally flawed. Another possible indicator of
media bias is "think-tank" citations, but it is impossible
to prove bias using citations alone - the content and accuracy
of citations and associated news reports must be examined for
one to make a credible claim of bias of any kind. Thus, a well
publicized (on the Right), recent paper claiming "liberal
bias" using a study of "think-tank" citations was
totally flawed and incorrect because, among other reasons, the
accuracy of news reports or citations was not addressed at all.
Some critics on the Right have attempted to prove
"liberal bias" by ostensibly looking at some of the
content in news reports. However, even here, claims are often baseless
for a variety of reasons: the critic's use of obvious
unintentional errors in news reports, the critic's ignorance
about the content, the use of opinions to distort straight news,
superficial fact checking (and sometimes NO fact checking
at all), or the use of various types of silly spin.
Two other common approaches should also be mentioned. One
involves the use of outright fabrications, lies or misleading
statements to claim media bias - which has become a cottage
industry of sorts, especially with the Far Right. The other
involves the use of rank hypocrisy (e.g., claiming "liberal
bias" based on actions, which when practiced by conservative
media outlets, is not considered conservative bias, by the same
critics).
The sections below provide more systematic coverage of
these different myth-making approaches. The bottom line is that, I
have yet to see *any* credible study that proves that the mainstream
media (MSM) in the U.S. has a "liberal bias" overall. As an
aside, let me add that I am fully aware that absence of evidence is
not the same as evidence of absence. Which is why, at Illiberal
Conservative Media, I am amassing evidence to show why the
mainstream media in the U.S. is not liberal (i.e., it is illiberal)
and most often conservatively biased.
SECTIONS
Part 1: Using "tone" of media coverage
Part 2: Using "catch-phrases" like
'right-wing extremist' v. 'left-wing extremist'
Part 3: Using "newspaper headlines"
Part 4: Using "topics" covered
Part 5: Using "think-tank" citations
Part 6: Using journalist ideology or voting
preferences
Part 7: Using public opinion polls on media bias
Part 8: Using obvious, unintentional errors in news
reports
Part 9: Using [the critic's] ignorance
Part 10: Using opinions to distort straight news
Part 11: Using superficial fact checking
Part 12: Using no fact checking
Part 13: Using rank hypocrisy
Part 14: Using outright fabrications, lies or
misleading statements
Part 15: Using miscellaneous spin
DETAILS
Part 1: Using "tone" of media coverage
[Posted originally at The
Left Coaster]
How the Liberal Media Myth is Created - Part 1
[Some portions of this post are taken from my existing
report on this topic at ICM; * indicates edits made for clarity].
Anyone surprised that there hasn't been much of a mention in the
lefty blogosphere about the Kerry v. Bush media coverage analysis from
the Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ)? I am.
In their annual State
of the News Media report of American Journalism for 2004, they
have this
sound bite in their summary:
When it came to the campaign, on the other hand, the criticism
that George Bush got worse coverage than John Kerry is supported by
the data. Looking
across all media, campaign coverage that focused on Bush was three
times as negative as coverage of Kerry (36% versus 12%) It was also
less likely to be positive (20% positive Bush stories, 30% for
Kerry).
That also meant Bush coverage was less likely to be neutral (44%
of Bush stories, 58% for Kerry).
Do a Google
search
for one of these passages and you'll see articles mentioning this
(like this one on MSNBC
saying: "Study: Election news negative toward Bush"
or Howard
Kurtz in WaPo saying: "A few readers have complained that I
failed to mention, in Monday's column about a Project for Excellence
in Journalism report, the finding on pro-Kerry bias last
year..."); you'll also find other GOP or Right-oriented sites (example)
touting it as (partial) vindication for their claims about the media
(partial because the Iraq
stats were not exactly "unfavorable" to Bush).
If you consider just the Kerry v. Bush data, is the report really
vindicating a "liberal media" claim? NO.
One of the follow-up articles
in the Sydney Morning Herald (via this
site) has this stunningly weak statement from the survey's
director, Tom Rosenstiel:
Mr Rosenstiel said these figures did not necessarily reflect bias
but, instead, the fact that coverage was always more intense and
questioning when it came to the incumbent.
Is that the best explanation that a credible journalism
organization could muster? Rosenstiel (or Kurtz or other media
outlets) do not seem to understand that something is not right when an
organization ostensibly measuring the quality of American journalism decides
to report statistics using measures used by politicians, rather than
the measures that should be used by journalists.
Here's why:
-
It is not measuring ACCURACY of news content,
only TONE. The terms "positive",
"negative" and "neutral" say nothing about
whether the coverage was accurate or not. The coverage
could be negative but accurate, and positive but fiction (as it
was with Bush in most cases). It could also have been positive but
accurate, and negative but fiction (as it was with Kerry in most
cases). Although they don't actually say this, PEJ seems to
implicitly fall for the fake spin (usually from the Right) that
somehow "fair and balanced" coverage requires balance in
tone, rather than accuracy in reporting!
-
For example, Bush did get negative coverage on
Iraq, but everything that happened in Iraq was his creation.
Lack of WMDs, lack of a real Saddam-Al-Qaeda link, depraved
indifference to the lives of Americans and Iraqi civilians, Abu
Ghraib, unsecured arms dumps and nuclear sites, mismanagement of
taxpayer dollars through massive corruption, and an endless amount
of other incompetence and mendacity was all fact.
Sure, schools may have been built and hospitals re-opened and
Iraqis "liberated" after enduring serious bombing
followed by a major cronyism-privatization campaign. Covering that
objectively (however "negative" that was) is a
requirement for good journalism and not something to feel
"negative" about. What is distressing is that the media
let the Bush administration go scot-free on lying to the public
about WMDs, the Saddam-Al Qaeda link, the cost of war, and a lot
more. Very little critical coverage actually occurred
particularly on the first two topics. So, while some of the
coverage on Bush may have been "negative", it was almost
always FACT. [Sec.
4.5 at ICM covers some of the media's extremely poor coverage
of Bush's AWOL record in the Texas Air National Guard].
-
On the other hand, a lot of negative coverage
against Kerry was FICTION - think "swift-boat-veterans"
or Kerry being labeled as more of a
"flip-flopper" than Bush (yeah,
right) [*sentence edited for clarity]. This is analogous
to what happened with Al Gore.
Bottom line? This kind of a survey is worthless to
assess the quality of journalism. It is useful to assess
"tone" of coverage but that is a very crude measure whose
usefulness is highly limited. Being "fair and balanced" does
not mean being "positive" and "negative" about the
same amount. It means being factual ALL the time.
On top of this, PEJ also noted this in a footnote:
2. The analysis of election coverage begins after
March 1 (Super Tuesday) after John Kerry emerged as the
all-but-official Democratic candidate. The cross-media comparisons
of campaign coverage included stories focused at least 50% on one
candidate or the other so that deriving a sense of tone about the
candidate was logical. Those totaled 250 stories. The findings,
moreover, reinforce what the Project found in a separate study that
looked at tone in the final month of the campaign, surrounding the
debates, and in a pre-convention study using a different methodology
that mapped coverage of different character themes about the
candidates. The findings on tone also mirror those of Robert Lichter
and the Center on Media and Public Affairs, which employs a
different approach to studying tone.
I am highlighting this to emphasize that the
"tone" report from Robert Lichter's CMPA for the 2004
election is likewise flawed because it ignores the factual content
of the coverage.
I can understand why conservative groups like the
CMPA pump money into studies of "tone" of coverage because
they can use it to (unjustifiably) claim "liberal bias" at
every opportunity. What I can't fathom is why reputed organizations
like PEJ spend so much resources studying something which says
woefully little about the quality of journalism in this country.
[Incidentally, Ron
at Watching The Watchers also emphasizes the point I have made
(not shown above) about the very limited sample size of the PEJ
study.]
Part 2: Using "catch-phrases" like
'right-wing extremist' v. 'left-wing extremist'
[Posted originally at The
Left Coaster]
How the Liberal Media Myth is Created - Part 2
In Part
1 of this series, I covered myths created about "liberal
bias" using "tone" of media coverage. In this
part, the creation of "liberal media" myths by the Right
using "catch-phrases" is highlighted. The basic MO of the
Right here is to:
- Either mine databases for "words", without
looking at context or usage (let me call this "Type
A" BS, for convenience)
- Or to mine databases for "words" without
establishing any controls for comparison ("Type B"
BS)
Let's start with a couple of examples of "Type B" BS.
Here's Bob
Somerby of The Daily Howler:
Trembling over his acolyte’s brilliance, Sullivan quoted at
length:
RUFFINI, AS QUOTED BY SULLIVAN: Since 1996, the Washington Post
has used this loaded term ["right-wing"] more than twice
as frequently as "left-wing"…This disparity was even
more palpable at the New York Times, where 80.2% of the left-right
mentions on the national news pages since 1996 have spotlighted
the right. The research also found that the more loaded and
derogatory the phrase, the more likely it was to be associated
with the political right. The term "conservative"
outpolled "liberal" by 66-34% in New York Times news
page mentions, while the aforementioned "right-wing"
clocked in at 80% in a similar measure. However, the term
"right-wing extremist" was used at least six times as
frequently than "left-wing extremist" (at 87.4% since
’96 in the Times). [emphasis added]
If that didn’t prove it, nothing would. At the New York Times,
"right-wing extremist" was used much more often than
"left-wing extremist." Case closed.
But duh. Does unequal usage of those terms show a liberal bias?
We were dubious, so we did a test—we checked out the use of these
terms at the Washington Times. How many times did the Wes
Pruden rag use those terms in the last five years? Our finding? The
Washington Times reeks of liberal bias! In fact, its liberal
bias is even worse than that found in the Times of New York!
...According to NEXIS, if you start your search at 1/1/96,
here’s how the Times Two stack up:
The Washington Times:
Right-wing extremist: 86 uses
Left-wing extremist: 9 uses
The New York Times:
Right-wing extremist: 75 uses
Left-wing extremist: 9 uses
According to Sullivan’s brilliant technique, the WashTimes has
slightly more liberal bias. Question: Where in the world—where
on earth—did we ever come up with this dud?
Somerby provided another
example while reviewing the book "Slander" by the anti-American
Ann Coulter:
COULTER (page 166): Despite the constant threat of the
“religious right” in America, there is evidently no such thing
as the “atheist left.” In a typical year, the New York
Times refers to either “Christian conservatives” or the
“religious right” almost two hundred times. But in a Lexis/Nexis
search of the entire New York Times archives, the phrases
“atheist liberals” or “the atheist left” do not appear
once. Only deviations from the left-wing norm merit labels.
In a footnote, Coulter extends her complaint. “In a one year
period (roughly corresponding to calendar year 2000), the New York
Times found occasion to mention either ‘Christian conservatives’
or the ‘religious right’ 187 times. Not once did the paper refer
to ‘atheist liberals’ or ‘the atheist left.’” To Coulter,
of course, this is all a sign of gruesome bias. She goes on to claim
that the terms “religious right” and “Christian
conservative” are now used “[j]ust as some people once spat out
the term ‘Jew’ as an insult.”
It certainly makes for high excitement, but does it make any
sense? Do newspapers use “Christian conservative” as an emblem
of hatred, and avoid “atheist left” due to liberal bias? If
so, we have big news to share. If Coulter’s NEXIS search has
proven these things, then the once-conservative Washington
Times is spilling with lib bias, too.
In the calendar year 2000, how often did the New York Times
refer to “Christian conservatives” or the “religious
right?” A NEXIS search of that year presents 182 references. But
the Washington Times—a much slimmer paper—had 151 such
cites that same year. And how about those other terms—“atheist
liberals” or “the atheist left?” Incredibly, Coulter was
right in one of her claims; the New York Times never used either
term. But guess what? The Washington Times never used the
terms, either. If Coulter has sniffed out a vast left-wing plot,
Wes Pruden is in on it too.
Why do newspapers write about “Christian conservatives?”
Because they exist, and because they’re important.
And why don’t we read about the “atheist left?” Because the
group doesn’t exist.
Let's now turn to "Type A" BS.
Here, Stanford Professor Geoffrey Nunberg's work at The
American Prospect, which was done in the context of reviewing
the fraudster
Bernard
Goldberg's book "Bias", is very useful to illustrate
the point (bold text is my emphasis):
One response to the piece came from Bernard
Goldberg himself, whose bestseller Bias has given wide
circulation to the notion that the press define liberals as the
mainstream by labeling conservatives far more than they do
liberals. In an op-ed
piece in the Miami Herald, Goldberg offers two numbers
to prove his point about labeling. First, he says that a six-month
search of The New York Times showed that the word
"conservative" popped up in news stories 1,580 times;
"liberal" only 802 times.
Well, but so what? Goldberg didn't bother to
check how many of those instances of "conservative" and
"liberal" were used as labels of American politicians or
interest groups, much less to relativize those numbers to the
occurrences of the names of each. For that matter, he didn't even
try to screen out occurrences of "conservative" that
referred to European political parties, business suits, or
investment strategies, not to mention occurrences of
"liberal" that referred to loan repayment terms and
helpings of gravy. In short, these figures are utterly meaningless.
Goldberg's other number involves one of those
specious comparisons that critics of liberal media bias are prone
to. In this case, he points out that "the Los Angeles
Times ran only 98 stories about the Concerned Women for
America and identified the group as conservative 28 times. But The
LA Times ran more than 1,000 stories on the National
Organization for Women and labeled NOW liberal only seven
times."
But that's meretricious, in every sense of the
term. Concerned
Women for America is a self-identified conservative Christian
group (it opposes, among other things, abortion, homosexual
adoption, hate-crime legislation, the AmeriCorps volunteer
program, and the teaching of "ill-conceived Darwinian
theory" in the schools). Whereas NOW makes a point of
rejecting explicitly partisan labels -- the appropriate
description of the group is "feminist." To insist on
labeling it as "liberal" would be to assume that to be
pro-choice makes you by definition a liberal, by which criterion
Goldberg ought to be equally indignant that the press doesn't use
the "liberal" label for Christine Todd Whitman or Tom
Ridge.
...
Brent Bozell's column
on my TAP article develops this strategy at length.
Bozell claims that I ignored studies by the Media
Research Center that show discrepancies in the labeling of
what he takes to be conservative and liberal groups. For example,
he says, newspaper stories on the Competitive Enterprise Institute
included a conservative label 28 percent of the time, compared to
less than one percent for the Sierra Club, and that Concerned
Women for America is labeled far more often than Planned
Parenthood.
But those comparisons are as transparently loaded
as Goldberg's are. After all, the Sierra Club membership came
close to adopting a resolution favoring immigration restriction a
few years ago, and Planned Parenthood proudly points
out that Peggy Goldwater was the founder of its Arizona
chapter. To insist that the press describe these groups as liberal
amounts to demanding that it adopt the lexicon of the right on a
wholesale basis, like a baseball manager demanding that the team's
own fans should determine the strike zone. Again, this one is for
the bleachers.
It's notable that Bozell doesn't mention any
figures for well-known groups like the Americans for Democratic
Action (ADA) or the Center for Justice, who fairly deserve to be
labeled as liberal or progressive. As it happens, I did counts
for a number of political organizations like these, and if I
wanted to play Bozell's game I could point out that ADA and the
Center for Justice are labeled far more often than conservative
groups like the National Association of Scholars, the Center for
the Study of Popular Culture, or the Competitive Enterprise
Institute. But that would be misleading -- the fact is that
there's a lot of unaccountable variation in the frequency of
labeling of groups, with some groups on both sides, like the
Heritage Foundation and ADA, being labeled far more than others.
Other responses to my
study are worthy of more serious discussion. The blogger Edward
Boyd went to the trouble of replicating a part of the study on
the last six months of the Nexis "Major Papers" database
(probably not the best period to pick, since the coverage of
American politics has been decidedly atypical in the months
following September 11). Boyd used the ten names that I used in my
test set, and found that conservatives on average were labeled as
"conservative" about fifteen percent more often than
liberals were labeled as "liberal."
Not surprisingly, a few conservative bloggers
trumpeted Boyd's results as having
"refuted" my claims. But even if Boyd's results were
valid, that conclusion wouldn't hold. What Goldberg argued, after
all, was that there was a massive disproportion in the labeling of
conservatives, which is not the same as a fifteen percent
difference. Still, Boyd's result surprised me, since the American
papers in the Nexis database are largely the same ones I looked
at.
But there turns out to be a very big fly in Boyd's
ointment. He himself points to the problem when he notes that the
database he used contained some English-language foreign papers
that might have skewed the results. In fact, fully 32 of the 80
papers in the database are foreign, ranging from the Sydney
Telegraph to the Scotsman, the Tokyo Daily Yomuri,
and The Jerusalem Post. And when I ran these searches in
the Nexis "non-US news" database, which includes all of
the foreign papers in the database that Boyd looked at, it turned
out that foreign papers label American conservatives more than
four times as often as they label liberals -- possibly because of
their point of view, but more likely because "liberal"
often has another meaning in foreign contexts and because American
conservatives like Jesse Helms, John Ashcroft, and Trent Lott are
much better known abroad than liberals like Barbara Boxer, Barney
Frank, Tom Harkin, or Paul Wellstone.
That disparity introduces a strong tilt in favor
of labeling conservatives into the overall data. In fact, when
you correct Boyd's results for the relative disproportion of
labels in the foreign papers in the database -- a matter of fairly
simple math -- you find that the likely rate of labeling in
the American papers in the database favors the labeling of
liberals by an 18 percent margin. In short, Boyd's data
confirm my own, or at least as best as one can make sense of such
a small and noisy sample.
One other point worth mentioning is that Boyd did
another search that included not just the labels
"conservative" and "liberal," but also the
labels "right wing" and "left wing," which
increased the disparity in the labeling of conservatives to around
30 percent.
...
The bottomline though, as Nunberg and Somerby point out, is that these
kind of word games are nonsensical and are of virtually no use in
proving "bias", especially without context or controls.
Moreover, as I emphasized in Part
1, any analysis that does not measure accuracy of the media
coverage is really not measuring media bias at all. So, anyone
who seriously purports to show "liberal bias" using such
shoddy approaches (especially *only* such approaches) is a quack.
[NOTE: At Illiberal
Conservative Media (ICM), I've provided a lot more detail on the
fakery in Goldberg's
"Bias", Coulter's
"Slander" and Goldberg's
"Arrogance" (puns intended)].
Part 3: Using "newspaper headlines"
[Posted originally at The
Left Coaster]
How the Liberal Media Myth is Created - Part 3
In Part
1 of this series, I covered myths created about "liberal
bias" using "tone" of media coverage. In Part
2, the creation of "liberal media" myths by the Right
using "catch-phrases" was covered. In this part, I highlight
a third approach used to create the "liberal media" myth -
"newspaper headlines".
The offending pair on the Right in this case are John
Lott and Kevin Hassett (of the American Enterprise Institute - AEI),
in their 2004
paper "Is Newspaper Coverage of Economic Events Politically
Biased?". (Yes, this
John
Lott).
I've covered this paper more extensively at ICM - here,
but I'm going to reproduce a few key portions that illustrate how
myth-creation works in this case.
The abstract of this paper says the following (bold
text is my emphasis):
Accusations of political bias in the media are often
made by members of both political parties, yet there have been few
systematic studies of such bias to date. This paper develops
an econometric technique to test for political bias in news
reports that controls for the underlying character of the news
reported. Our results suggest that American newspapers tend to give
more positive news coverage to the same economic news when
Democrats are in the Presidency than for Republicans. When all types
of news are pooled into a single analysis, our results are highly
significant. However, the results vary greatly depending upon which
economic numbers are being reported. When GDP growth is reported,
Republicans received between 16 and 24 percentage point fewer
positive stories for the same economic numbers than Democrats.
For durable goods for all newspapers, Republicans received between
15 and 25 percentage points fewer positive news stories than
Democrats. For unemployment, the difference was between zero and 21
percentage points. Retail sales showed no difference. Among the
Associated Press and the top 10 papers, the Washington Post, Chicago
Tribune, Associated Press, and New York Times tend to be the least
likely to report positive news during Republican
administrations, while the Houston Chronicle slightly favors
Republicans. Only one newspaper treated one Republican
administration significantly more positively than the Clinton
administration: the Los Angeles Times’ headlines were most
favorable to the Reagan administration, but it still favored Clinton
over either Bush administration. We also find that the media coverage
affects people’s perceptions of the economy. Contrary to the
typical impression that bad news sells, we find that good economic
news generates more news coverage and that it is usually
covered more prominently. We also present some evidence that media
treats parties differently when they control both the presidency and
the congress.
Why have I highlighted specific words? Well,
when you read about the methodology they use, you'll understand (bold
text is my emphasis):
In this paper, we attempt to overcome these problems
by objectively categorizing newspaper headlines as either
positive, negative, neutral or mixed and then comparing those
headlines to the actual economic numbers that generated those news
articles.
They study newspaper headlines and not the
actual content of the articles (wow) - and I would bet that
anyone who reads the abstract of the paper could easily miss this
point, namely that their "study" is based on headlines
- not "news reports", "news coverage",
"stories", "news stories", etc. I imagine it
must be particularly busy out there at AEI.
Now, they do acknowledge this silliness (not in so
many words of course), among other things (bold text is my emphasis):
We chose headlines because they create the strongest
image of the news in readers’ minds, and because headlines are
easier to objectively classify, though the headlines we examine
may differ systematically from the stories they are associated with.
While newspapers write other news stories on the economy that do
not coincide with the specific release of economic data, one benefit
of limiting ourselves to these announcement dates is that we can
more directly link a specific set of economic data to how the media
covers that data. It is possible that these other news stories are
biased in ways that are different from stories released on
announcement dates, and thus announcement date coverage might not
give the complete picture of any partisan biases. The values for
the different economic variables were those released at the time of
the news reports.
So, let's recap.
-
They only look at headlines; they don't look at
the actual content of articles
-
They only consider headlines associated with
articles that coincide with the release of the economic data and
not at any other articles that may be published about the same
data subsequently
-
They acknowledge that "It is possible that
these other news stories are biased in ways that are different
from stories released on announcement dates, and thus announcement
date coverage might not give the complete picture of any partisan
biases"
-
And predictably, they make firm
conclusions from their data anyway
Let's just say I didn't have it this easy in graduate
school. And they actually get paid big bucks to write this stuff up,
while I have to do this on my own dime. That said, these flaws
are the least of the paper's problems.
Tim
Lambert of Deltoid, who has done tremendous public service by
exposing Lott's repeated shoddy work and lying on the topic of guns,
also covered this paper. The following extract from one
of his posts shows, in a nutshell, what is wrong with this whole
paper:
Now, here’s what Lott and Hassett say:
“In the case of unemployment, 44 percent of the headlines under
the Clinton administration were positive while that same number
was only 23 percent under Bush II. By comparison, the average
unemployment rates were fairly similar, 5.2 percent under Clinton
s eight years and 5.5 percent under Bush during the sample. There
is also a great deal of overlap (3.9 to 7.1 percent under Clinton
to 4.2 to 6.4 percent under Bush II).”
What they fail to mention and what is obvious from the graph is that
under Clinton the unemployment rate decreased from
7.1% to 3.9%, while under Bush it increased from
4.2% to 6.4%. Maybe, just maybe, that’s why the headlines were
more positive under Clinton. In fact, there seems to be evidence of
bias against Clinton—why were only 44% of the headlines about
unemployment positive when it just kept going down and down to the
lowest levels in decades? Oh, and don’t expect to see a graph of
the unemployment rate anywhere in their paper or presentation.
Now, they claim to have controlled for level and trends in
unemployment in their analysis, but of course they have not. The
only control they have for trend is the change since the previous
quarter and it is obvious that changes over longer terms will affect
the reporting. Do Lott and Hassett believe that no-one ever compares
the unemployment rate with what it was a year or two before?
Through a Google search I came across this
post at Dead Parrots Society that explored the unemployment
comparison further (not specifically in the context of the Lott/Hassett
paper, but in the context of a similarly nonsensical "media
bias" post by another blogger, using the employment figures):
Via
Glenn Reynolds, I and many
others have been reading this
Tim Blair post about media framing of unemployment figures. The
gist is that CNN described a 5.6% unemployment rate as
"low" in 1996, when Clinton was in office, but describes a
similar rate as a sign of problems for Bush. Tim's post is being
widely cited as yet more proof of media bias; in Glenn's link, he
encourages us to "Go figure." So I did.
The graphic is courtesy
of the BLS, and shows the unemployment rate charted over the
past 15 years. Perhaps it offers a little insight into why 5.6% was
considered "low" in early 1996, but not in 2001. Actually,
the context was right there in the excerpts Blair chose from the
1996 CNN story:
Economists didn't expect June's unemployment rate to be much
different from May's, which was an already-low 5.6 percent. But in
fact, it did fall -- to 5.3 percent. The unemployment rate
hasn't been that low since June 1990.
And from the 2001 CNN story:
The U.S. unemployment rate jumped to 5.7 percent in November - the
highest in six years - as employers cut hundreds of thousands
more jobs in response to the first recession in a decade in the
world's largest economy.
....
Still, there is some context that might be helpful. The first
place we can look is right there in Tim Blair's 1996 story, to see
how the Clinton administration and economic analysts felt about the
numbers:
White House: But the Clinton administration was
tickled about the increase in jobs, and took credit for the
upturn. The president said the figures showed "the most solid
American economy in a generation."
Analysts: In January, analysts were concerned that growth
was so anemic that the nation was in danger of a recession. But
five straight months of strong job gains now have analysts worried
more about inflation. ... The Federal Reserve is almost guaranteed
to push interest rates up to stave off inflation.
The second place we can look for context is in Tim Blair's 2001
story, to see how the Bush administration and economic analysts felt
about that very similar unemployment figure:
White House: President Bush and his Labor Secretary,
Elaine Chao, separately expressed alarm at the data and called for
Congress to approve a package of economic stimulus. "Today's
numbers are not good news, and I think it's a clear reflection
that the attacks of Sept. 11 are still reverberating around our
economy," Chao told CNNfn's Market Call program.
Analysts: To keep consumers spending despite mounting
unemployment, the Federal Reserve has cut its target for
short-term interest rates 10 times this year and is expected to do
so again after its policy makers meet Tuesday. "Despite some
better-than-expected data over the past two weeks, this report is
sufficiently gloomy to force the Fed to ease next Tuesday and
retain their bias toward further economic weakness," said
Steven Wood, economist with FinancialOxygen.
Really, my point here doesn't have anything to do with whether a
5.6% unemployment rate is too hot, too cold or just right. Frankly,
I don't have any idea. What I do know is that journalists
weren't the only ones who looked at the unemployment figures in a
different light between 1996 and 2001. The reality is, the media saw
the data the same way as the White House, economic analysts and the
Fed.
Thus, even at a fundamental, conceptual level, the Lott/Hassett
paper is a bunch of garbage and proves absolutely nothing about bias
in news reporting.
This goes back to the point I have been making in each of my
previous posts. Accuracy. You cannot assess bias without
understanding how accurate the report is, and you certainly can't
figure out the accuracy by either looking at headlines alone or
headlines compared to out-of-context data points. There is also a lot
more detail within those numbers which could influence the news
reporting, as one of the commenters (Barry Ritholtz) to the Dead
Parrots Society post noted - such as quality of jobs created v. lost,
spread between wage growth and CPI, the underemployment rate, those
who have dropped out of the workforce, etc.
Part 4: Using "topics" covered
[Posted originally at The
Left Coaster]
How the Liberal Media Myth is Created - Part 4
UPDATE 4/16/05: It was brought to my attention that the
version of the paper I
had originally linked to and analyzed is not the final version of
Puglisi's paper. The latest version is available for download here.
I apologize for this inadvertent /unintentional error. Given this, I
made appropriate (minor) modifications in my detailed analysis at ICM,
and in this post, to reflect the content and pagination in the final
version of the paper. Having said that, Puglisi's conclusions or my
critiques of his assumptions, data or conclusions have not changed
with the latest version of his paper. Thus, the substance
of my critique remains unchanged. (I also made some cosmetic
changes to the post). The version of the post prior to 4/16/05 is
archived here.
---
This is the continuation of a series on how the "liberal
media" myth is created. Previous installments covered how this
myth is created using "tone" of media coverage (Part
1), using "catch-phrases" like 'right-wing
extremist' v. 'left-wing extremist' (Part
2), and using "newspaper headlines" (Part
3). In this part, I address a fourth (superficial) approach
used for creating a myth of "liberal media" - "topics"
covered.
The focus of this part is the 2004 paper, "Being
the New York Times: The Political Behaviour of a Newspaper"
by Riccardo Puglisi of the London School of Economics (LSE) (which I
discovered via Marginal
Revolution). I have provided a more systematic critique of this
paper at Illiberal
Conservative Media (ICM) - Sec.
2.10; here I will highlight some portions of that critique.
The issue of topic choice is important in media bias analysis, but
like everything else it has to be treated with some sophistication to
eliminate false results/conclusions. As I have indicated before at ICM:
Topic choice is certainly a function of editorial bias, but it
also a function of numerous other confounding factors -
source credibility, events, circumstances, issues of public
interest, issues of interest to politicians or policy-makers, issues
of interest to the media outlet to ensure their revenues and profits
in the markets they compete in, etc. So, it would be much more
difficult to credibly demonstrate editorial bias on topic
choice, by itself.
With that sentiment, let's look at Puglisi's paper, starting with
his abstract (bold text is my emphasis):
I analyze a dataset of news from the New York Times,
from 1946 to 1994. Controlling for the incumbent President’s
activity across issues, I find that during the presidential campaign
the New York Times gives more emphasis to topics that are owned
by the Democratic party (civil rights, health care, labour and
social welfare), when the incumbent President is a Republican. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that the New York Times has a
Democratic partisanship, with some "watchdog" aspects,
in that it gives more emphasis to issues over which the (Republican)
incumbent is weak. Moreover, out of the presidential campaign, there
are more stories about Democratic topics when the incumbent
President is a Democrat.
In my detailed critique of this paper, I've pointed out what I
believe are six major problems with this paper (I,
II,
III,
IV,
V,
VI).
I can't do full justice to all of those points here - so I am simply
going to condense my points here and refer interested readers to the full
critique for details.
First, here are some
assumptions stated by Puglisi for his study:
As briefly anticipated in the introduction, the
empirical analysis performed here and the interpretation of its
findings are based on the following set of identifying assumptions:
(1) The issue ownership hypothesis holds.
(2) “All publicity is good publicity”.
(3) The relative share of Executive Orders about a
subset of issues proxies the relative intensity of the activity of
the incumbent President with respect to those issues.
The issue ownership hypothesis, which Puglisi bases on
historical polling data and mentions throughout, is the following:
Democratic topics comprise Civil Rights, Health
Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare. Republican topics
comprise Defense and Law & Crime.
Now, it may be convenient to assign such ownership
because it helps make the analysis more interesting, but really,
someone "owning" the issue often has little to do
with whether the publicity/coverage that person gets on that issue is
good or bad (even if one can be sure that the "issue
ownership" actually holds). Thus, the second assumption, that
"All publicity is good publicity" (referring to "owned
issue" coverage for the person who owns it) simply makes no
sense. For example, was "Health Care" coverage always
"good publicity" for Bill Clinton (Democrat)? Was
"Defense" and "Law and Crime" coverage always
"good publicity" for Richard Nixon (Republican) and Ronald
Reagan (Republican)? Was "Employment" and "Social
Security" coverage necessarily always "bad" publicity
for the Reagan administration? In other words, the assumption
that if a newspaper reports on topics "owned" by a party, it
automatically means that party benefits, makes no sense because such
an assumption fails to account for the fact that newspapers, can and
do issue reports on "owned" topics that may not be positive
at all to the "owning" party.
Second, consider these
"definitions" offered from Puglisi:
Definition 1 A newspaper has a Democratic
(Republican) partisanship if during the presidential campaign it
devotes more space to issues owned by the Democratic (Republican)
party, at the expense of neutral or Republican (Democratic) issues.
...
In fact, over and above the electoral partisanship of the
newspaper, as described by definition 1, the political color of the
incumbent President could be given an interpretation within a
lapdog/watchdog dichotomy. The idea is the following: if it turns
out that -during the presidential campaign- the New York Times gives
less emphasis to Democratic topics and/or more emphasis to
Republican topics when the incumbent is a Democrat, over and above
his Democratic or Republican partisanship, this is consistent with
the fact that the newsaper acts as an electoral watchdog with
respect to the incumbent President.
...
Definition 2 A newspaper is an electoral lapdog of
the incumbent President if, ceteris paribus, during the presidential
campaign it devotes more space to the issues over which the
incumbent is strong, and/or less to issues over which the incumbent
is weak.
Definition 3 A newspaper acts as an
electoral watchdog if, ceteris paribus, during the presidential
campaign it dedicates more space to the issues over which the
incumbent is weak, and/or less space to the issues over which the
incumbent is strong.
Where do I begin?
These definitions are incorrect - not only are they
inconsistent with each other, the latter definitions are incorrect in
themselves. For example, I can just as well argue based on Puglisi's Definition
1 that the newspaper is no "watchdog" but just a shill
for the candidate opposing the incumbent and is therefore displaying
"partisanship" in favor of the challenger. In fact, let's
ignore Definition 1 completely and consider Definition 3
on its own. It is Puglisi's *opinion* that the newspaper serves as
a "watchdog" by focusing on the topics that supposedly favor
the challenger. One can easily have a different *opinion* that a
newspaper doing this is a partisan supporter of the challenger and not
a "watchdog". (Thus, setting up the definitions the way
Puglisi does, has the (unintentional and) unfortunate consequence of
pre-ordaining the results.)
This is the natural (and fully expected) problem with
studies of this nature which don't actually analyze the content
of the news articles. Thus, Puglisi's assumptions and definitions are
incorrect because at a very fundamental level, they neglect the actual
nature of the coverage (accurate or inaccurate). So,
combining Problem I and Problem II, this study and the interpretation
of its results totally break down even before we get to the actual
data. Needless to say, this study's findings are untenable, as
a result.
Third, by Puglisi's own
admission (Tables 2 and 3), when we look at "All stories"
that appeared in the New York Times in the period 1946-1994, the
so-called Republican topics and so-called Democratic topics were only
21.7% (8.37% + 13.36%) of the total. Thus, this study claims to show
"Democratic partisanship" (or otherwise) based on a study
that essentially ignores over 78% of all stories published in the New
York Times. Stunning.
For example, "Banking, Finance and Dom.
Commerce" (14.66% of all stories) and "International
Affairs" (13.22% of all stories) are not part of Puglisi's model
because they are not "owned" by Republicans or Democrats.
What category would "taxes" or "spending" or
"budget deficits" fall under? This is one of the most
important topics in all Presidential campaigns - which often make or
break campaigns - and there's no mention of it in the analysis. Also,
what category would draft-avoidance or alleged extra-marital affairs
fall in? Other? Or is it "Law and Crime?" There's a whole
slew of topics relating to the individuals or their policies, that
fall into the supposed "non-owned" issue category, which
have a habit of coming up frequently during campaigns. It may be
acceptable to ignore all that for the purpose of creating certain
limited hypotheses, but in the absence of any serious consideration of
some of these other topics, it is not advisable to reach sweeping
conclusions of the kind the author has.
Fourth, Puglisi's paper does
not consider seriously the fact that major events happen which have
nothing to do with the "strength" of Democrats or
Republicans. For example, George Bush Sr. started
significant cuts to defense spending at the end of the Cold War
and Bill Clinton continued this effort. When there are no major wars
and when there is no overarching concern about national
defense, there is no reason for papers to simply keep writing more
articles about "defense" just because a Democrat is in
power. This same argument applies to every topic under the sun.
It is also obvious that many topics are raised,
especially in electoral campaigns, by the politicians who are
campaigning. Not to mention, one of Puglisi's "findings"
is that the coverage of "Republican topics" actually goes up
significantly in the campaign coverage when the challenger is a
Republican. This takes us right back to Problem II. Either the NYT has
"Democratic partisanship" or it doesn't. It makes no sense
to claim that it has "Democratic partisanship" and
simultaneously say that "...under a Democratic incumbent there
are more stories about Republican topics when the presidential
campaign kicks in. This effect is quite strong in magnitude...". Why
is the latter considered a "watchdog" behavior rather than
"Republican partisanship"? After all, if part of the
"results" point one way, it is sufficient for Puglisi to
label it "partisanship" of one kind; yet, when another part
of the "results" points in another direction, it is not
partisanship in the other direction - it is "watchdog"ism.
Fifth, when I look at Puglisi's
basic data tables 3 and 4 (in his paper - see footnote), even if one
makes the assumption that Executive Orders get proportional coverage
in the NY Times (as he does), the numbers
I derived suggests that even when the New York Times'
topics-coverage is normalized to Executive Orders, it provided more
coverage overall on the "Republican" topics than on the
"Democratic" topics (I invite readers who are more
statistics-aware to comment on whether I made any mistakes in my
assumptions/calculations because I am not a statistics expert). This
seems to partly contradict his main conclusions (even if you ignore
the fundamental flaws I discussed above).
Sixth, Puglisi's study lacks
any *real* control for comparison. Even if we assume that the results
of this study are correct (which they are not), how can someone claim
that a paper is partisan without even evaluating another paper - with
an ideology known to be conservative - to see whether that paper's
topic coverage was similar or the opposite? We have no idea whether
Puglisi's findings will be "mirrored" or "similar"
in a rag like the Washington Times. But it was inappropriate to make
the kind of sweeping conclusions he makes in his paper without doing
such a basic comparison in the first place.
All in all, this is a deeply flawed paper that certainly does NOT
prove ANY liberal bias or Democratic "partisanship" on the
part of the New York Times. But it helps us learn yet another way
media bias myths are propagated.
Part 5: Using "think-tank" citations
[Posted originally at The
Left Coaster]
How the Liberal Media Myth is Created - Part 5
UPDATE 4/16/05: This is an updated version of my
original post which is archived here.
As I was doing a review of some other published literature on media
bias on 4/16/05, I discovered that Groseclose-Milyo (G-M) had posted
an updated version (HTML,
PDF)
of their original
paper as of 2005-01-03. The revised version of their paper
corrects some of lacunae in the original version; however, the most
fundamental problems with the original paper remain in this new
version. [NOTE: The fact that I missed the latest version
in my original critique was purely an unintentional oversight. The
updated G-M paper does not in any way invalidate my original critique
(indeed, one of the fixes they made shows that one part of my critique
was right on target). I have updated my critique here to refer to
their revised paper.]
---
This is a continuation of a series on how the "liberal
media" myth is created. Previous installments covered
myth-creation using "tone" of media coverage (Part
1), "catch-phrases" like 'right-wing extremist' v.
'left-wing extremist' (Part
2), "newspaper headlines" (Part
3) and "topics" covered (Part
4). This part highlights an unusual, indirect approach that
uses "think-tank" citations.
The focus of this post is a paper titled "A Measure of
Media Bias" (HTML,
PDF)
by Tim Groseclose and Jeff Milyo. I found this paper via Language
Log (there has
been some back and forth at Language Log between critic Geoffrey
Nunberg and the paper's authors), where it was also
noted that:
Groseclose and Milyo's study
has been approvingly cited by Bruce
Bartlett in National Review,
by Linda
Seebach in the Rocky Mountain
News, and by Harvard economist Robert
J. Barro in Business Week,
not to mention conservative bloggers like Instapundit,
Andrew
Sullivan, and Matt
Drudge, among a number of others, who trumpet its
"objectivity."
A single blog post, once again, is insufficient to provide a
detailed critique of the paper. So, I'll refer readers who are more
curious to my detailed critique over at ICM
- Sec. 2.9.
Here, I'll reproduce my summary (with links to details) showing why
this paper's conclusions are wrong.
The Groseclose-Milyo (G-M) paper (HTML,
PDF)
attempts to assess media bias using an approach wherein adjusted
ADA (Americans
for Democratic Action) scores (0-to-100) are used to assess
legislator ideology (archconservative-to-archliberal), and
separately, the think-tank citations of the legislators are compared
to the think-tank citations of the media outlet to then derive
the media outlet's "bias". Based on their methodology
(presented and discussed in this paper), they claim that:
Our results show a strong liberal bias.
I examined the paper from three perspectives:
1. Is the methodology used for assessing the ideology of think-tanks
correct and reliable?
2. Is the methodology used for assessing the ideology of the media
correct and reliable?
3. Is the definition of media bias used by the authors correct and
reliable?
The answers to each of those questions is NO.
Why?
The methodology used by the authors for assessing think-tank
ideology (i.e., based on the average adjusted ADA score of the
legislators citing the think-tank) is deeply
flawed because it omits public or private disagreements that
legislators have with the same think-tank and it does not
account for the fact that legislators may agree with a think-tank but
not state it publicly for various reasons (e.g., they are unaware
of the think-tank; they are aware of the think-tank but the latter may
not be known well enough to cite, it may be a
"controversial" think-tank, there may be no need to
cite a think-tank, etc.). This can effectively skew their results in
the wrong direction, to an unknown degree. For example,
the fact that their methodology found the ACLU to be
"conservative" was a result of the former flaw. To
address this, they say:
The reason the ACLU has such a low score is
that it opposed the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance bill, and
conservatives in Congress cited this often.
In fact, slightly more than one-eight of all ACLU citations
in Congress were due to one person alone, Mitch McConnell (R.-Kt.),
perhaps the chief critic of McCain-Feingold.
If we omit McConnell’s citations, the ACLU’s average
score increases to 55.9. Because
of this anomaly, in the Appendix we report the results when we
repeat all of our analyses but omit the ACLU data.
Unfortunately, omitting McConnell's citations or the ACLU data
point is the wrong approach to fix this problem. The way to fix this
is by actually ADDING all those instances in which Republicans
actually disagreed with ACLU, not incorrectly and artificially remove
situations where *they agreed with ACLU* in order to get an average
score that seems more in sync with a *separately established* reality.
In other words, if we already knew ACLU is "liberal" and
need to know that to "adjust the data", then what is the
value or point of this study?
Additionally, a legislator may cite a think tank not because
he or she mostly agrees with the think tank but because that
think tank's view is closer to his or her view than any other
think-tank the legislator is aware of or cares to cite. It
is very unlikely that legislators who cite a think tank agree with everything
the think tank says or stands for. For example, some legislators may
cite it because their position is in agreement with, say, only one
or two or three of the think tank's positions and they may cite it
for that reason, repeatedly (like in the ACLU case). The bottom line
is that their think-tank ideology ratings are unreliable and
incorrect, as I show in detail in at
ICM Sec. 2.9.
The methodology used by the authors for assessing media ideology
is completely untenable. There are three principal reasons
for this:
(a) The approach G-M use establishes media ideology indirectly,
by using the media's think-tank citations and comparing those to
think-tank citations by legislators in order to find the legislator
whose citations are the closest match. Thus, if a legislator is
liberal and the media's think-tank citations match that of the liberal
legislator, they would declare the media to be liberal. Momentarily
setting aside the fact that this definition of media bias is itself
incorrect, their claim
would make sense only if it can be independently proven that
the think-tanks cited by the liberal legislator are actually
liberal. Their study does not prove this at all,
considering that their methodology to establish think-tank ideology is
itself deficient. Thus, at a fundamental level, their entire
conclusion on media bias breaks down. (NOTE: It is not at all
implausible that left-leaning legislators may cite more centrist
think-tanks in public than progressive/liberal ones, especially
considering how the liberal advocacy groups and think-tanks are tarred
negatively by the GOP in the illiberal
conservative media).
(b) The use of weighted-average ADA scores (for the House and the
Senate) is slightly more meaningful than the Median (which they used
in the original version of their paper), but
even this is completely deficient and incorrect because the
ideological center is set not using an independent, objective
measure of ideology but based on the (political) positions of the
people in Congress at a given point in time. Thus, their model
simultaneously assumes that ADA scores can provide an absolute
picture of a legislator's ideology but that media and think-tank
ideology should be determined not using the same absolute reference
but a relative, moving reference that is highly
dependent on who's the majority in Congress and how they think or
vote. This is not an acceptable model, for, if the minority party
becomes the majority party in the next election, the derived ideology
of think-tanks or the media could change significantly even though their
actual positions underwent ZERO change.
Put another way, if the Republican majority suddenly decides
to become 100% conservative, guess what happens. The weighted-mean
ADA score would drop, even if the Democrats in Congress DID
NOT change at all, and even if the media outlets that are considered
"liberal", by the G-M definition, remain STATIC (i.e., no
change in their think-tank citation ratios and that of the
corresponding "liberals" in Congress). In this case, even
though the media's ideology has NOT changed at all, it's adjusted ADA
score(s) will artificially look more liberal compared to the lower
weighted-mean ADA score. (BONUS FOR LEFTIES: This is right in line
with one of the long-time Republican strategies of declaring the media
(and Democrats) to be too "liberal" by moving the country to
the Right). This is not a partisan issue though. The opposite could
occur when we are talking about media outlets that are considered
"conservative" because they match the citations of
conservative Republicans and if the Democrats decide to become 100%
liberal.
(c) The final, and perhaps most serious, problem with their
analysis is their attempt to derive a conclusion of media bias using
this study - because their definition of media bias, is in itself,
completely flawed. Their confident conclusion that they have
demonstrated "liberal" media bias is
wrong because the study does not examine whether the media's news
reporting is accurate. Their assumption that "seldom
do journalists make dishonest statements" is also fatally
incorrect. The focus on think-tank citations completely ignores what
the media communicates to viewers or readers when it is NOT citing
think-tanks, which is a big chunk of the time. The irony
of the authors' citing serial
liar Brent Bozell's claim that there is "rarely
a conscious attempt to distort the news" is incredibly
ironic! Their claim that "the citations
that they gather from experts are also very rarely dishonest or
inaccurate" also suggests that they are very un-skeptical
when it comes to absorbing news.
When
controlled for other factors, the more fundamental determinant
of bias in news reporting is accuracy -- not whom the
news reports cite. To the extent that news reporting could become
inaccurate by citing certain think-tanks over others, one may have
a case that think-tank citations could influence the accuracy
of the reports. But, G-M have fallen into the trap of assuming that
the part is the whole. Think-tank citations are merely one part of the
whole - which is the media's accuracy in news reporting.
Part 6: Using journalist ideology or voting
preferences
[Posted originally at The
Left Coaster]
How the Liberal Media Myth is Created - Part 6
This is a continuation of a series on how the "liberal
media" myth is created. Previous installments covered
myth-creation using "tone" of media coverage (Part
1), "catch-phrases" like 'right-wing extremist' v.
'left-wing extremist' (Part
2), "newspaper headlines" (Part
3), "topics" covered (Part
4) and "think-tank" citations (Part
5). This part highlights attempts to create a "liberal
media" myth using surveys of journalist ideology or voting
preferences.
Ever so often, hapless readers are treated to yet another survey or
"study" showing how "most" journalists are
"liberal" in their ideology or voting preferences. This is
usually accompanied by the expected braying by the usual suspects on
the Right about how journalists are therefore biased
"liberal" in their news coverage. This is not a new
phenomenon. As David Brock has pointed out in his seminal book "The
Republican Noise Machine", one of the earliest such
"studies" was in the book "The Media Elite: America's
New Powerbrokers" by S. Robert Lichter et al. (bold text is my
emphasis):
The revelation that most reporters surveyed voted
Democratic, even in years of Republican landslides like 1972, was
one from which the media's reputation for objectivity probably never
recovered. Most people are not trained journalists. They either
don't know, or don't believe, that the profession aspires to
impartiality. They have little idea of how competitive and
commercial concerns, pressure to conform, deference to power, a
desire to avoid being labeled "liberal" by right-wing
critics, and myriad other biases can influence a story at the
expense of any personal political beliefs. They do know that news
stories are not churned out by a computer and that personal
judgments must enter into the equation somewhere along the line;
they presume that politics naturally does, too. For many, this one
statistic about how workaday reporters and editors tend to vote, and
the attendant presumption that voting habits determined any bias in
their work, closed the case before the subject of the voting
patterns of media owners, executives, and top editors could even be
broached. That was a question, among many others, that The Media
Elite hadn't bothered to ask.
The Lichters used a very small sample to reach their
sweeping conclusions. The study relied on the voluntary responses of
238 print and broadcast journalists out of 210,000 editors and
reporters and 47,000 TV journalists then working in the field.21
And the Lichters' ideological profiling was slippery. By choosing
the "business elite," a traditionally conservative group,
as a point of comparison, rather than, say, teachers, or truck
drivers, or even a sampling of general American public opinion, the
authors seemed predetermined to make the media appear more liberal
and out of touch with mainstream values than it actually was.22
...
"Liberal bias" was a handy rallying point that the
Lichters failed not only to prove, but to even charge.
Though the book's reviewers suggested the opposite,
the authors concluded that the media was not liberally biased - a
concept the authors defined as calculatedly unfair. They stated
flatly that the media's social liberalism did not manifest itself in
coverage of Democrats or Republicans, of legislative debates, or
even of liberals and conservatives. They pointed to the great
ideological diversity within news organizations, claiming that the Washington
Post was more "pro-environment" but far more
economically conservative than the New York Times. Many years
later, in a 1997 interview with the Moonie magazine Insight, Robert
Lichter said: "Conservative columnists all over the place were
saying that we proved that there was a liberal bias in the press,
which at the time we had not."
...
At several points in the book, the authors knocked down entirely the
idea that the media's "ideological profile" biased its
coverage. For example, they wrote: "When leading journalists
confront new information, they usually manage to process it without
interjecting their own viewpoints."
Since then, of course there have been many more such
surveys or "studies" and I cover some of them at ICM
(e.g., see, Sec.
2.2, Sec.
2.8, and Sec.
4.1). One of the general points that emerges from some of the
later, somewhat more credible, surveys is that the majority
of journalists claim to be centrist rather than liberal or
conservative (on social and economic issues) - but, of the remainder,
more tend to be liberal on social issues and conservative on economic
issues, than the other way around. Now, even if we believe these
surveys, do they somehow prove overall "liberal
bias" in news coverage? The answer is a resounding NO (partly
explained below). Why do some conservatives in the media then persist
in pushing this spin point at every opportunity? Because they can.
Because they could care less about facts. And....because the ICM
lets them.
Let's also look at this from another perspective.
The media is awash with conservative commentators, op-ed writers,
columnists, talking heads and talk show hosts. Clearly many of these
people are strong supporters of the Republican party and vote
Republican. If those among them who peddle the above theory actually
believe it, then it means they also accept that they themselves
are completely biased and cannot be trusted with anything they report
on or write about because it would not be "fair and
balanced". Or at least one would think they accept that. But
when Fox News comically keeps insisting that they are "fair and
balanced", they are actually making a claim that it is possible
to support a particular political party and ideology and yet be
"fair and balanced." So which one is it folks? Make up
your mind.
Now, since I am trying to address serious and
credible media critics, let me summarize why a so-called
"liberal" journalist ideology has not resulted in overall
"liberal media" bias:
- Because
newspaper publishers and media owners (and often even editors) historically
tend to be more conservative and endorse/vote for Republicans
rather than Democrats - and they usually have much more control
(and censorship) over news coverage than the journalists who are
farther down the chain, especially in this era of corporatist
media "monopolies". (Not
to mention that publisher/editor-driven newspaper endorsements
have a higher probability of influencing votes than journalist
preferences.)
- Because the repeated and egregious mainstream media malpractice
and fraud against leading Democrats is well
known,
to the point that even
conservatives have been forced to admit it (albeit in
"softer" terms).
- Because
the coverage of Bush (and the GOP) has long
been fawning and/or largely uncritical (and not just on 9/11 and Iraq),
such that a Democratic president would have been impeached in this
country over far, far less (and don't forget this).
- Because
even many of the so-called "liberals" in the media have
a demonstrated record, especially in recent years, of being
afraid to tell the truth, unlike their counterparts on the Right
(in the media) who are never
afraid to mislead or lie to their readers/viewers
- I could go on and on....but the "on and on" part is
reserved for future posts about why the media is actually
conservatively biased overall - so you'll have to bear with
me (or you can just go browse ICM)
:-)
Conservatives who keep recycling the magical "liberal
bias" meme despite the (above) facts, may best be remembered as
being the Bernard
Goldbergs
of the world. Why? I'll let the incomparable Bob Somerby explain:
GOLDBERG (page 13): “Then what about the mainstream
media’s treatment of Clinton? You can’t possibly think they
went easy on him, can you?” is what liberals always ask.
It’s a fair question. And the answer is, no, they didn’t
go easy on Clinton. The truth is, reporters will go after any
politician—liberal or conservative—if the story is big enough
and the politician is powerful enough.
Strange, isn’t it? The press corps is swimming in liberal
bias—but they “didn’t go easy on Clinton,” this
generation’s most important liberal pol! (Bernie doesn’t mention
the trashing of Gore.) But then, Bernie can talk his way out of
anything. Here’s the way he gets around the media’s coverage of
Bush:
GOLDBERG (pages 10-11): Perhaps the charge liberals have
been making most often to back their claim of conservative bias is
that the media have given George W. Bush a free ride on some very
important issues involving foreign policy and national security.
For a while you could hardly open up a liberal magazine or go to a
liberal Web site without finding some bitter screed about how the
press was sucking up to the president on everything from the war
in Iraq to supposed civil liberties abuses at home. But the truth
is, all the media were doing was what the media always do in times
of war: They were rallying round the flag.
Can’t you see? There’s an answer for everything! In
BernieVille, the media can “go after Clinton” and give Bush “a
free ride,” but they’re still thick with that rank liberal bias!
[eRiposte emphasis]
Part 7: Using public opinion polls on media bias
[Posted originally at The
Left Coaster]
How the Liberal Media Myth is Created - Part 7
This is a continuation of a series on how the "liberal
media" myth is created. Previous installments covered
myth-creation using "tone" of media coverage (Part
1), "catch-phrases" like 'right-wing extremist' v.
'left-wing extremist' (Part
2), "newspaper headlines" (Part
3), "topics" covered (Part
4), "think-tank" citations (Part
5) and journalist ideology or voting preferences (Part
6). This part highlights attempts to create a "liberal
media" myth using public opinion polls on media bias.
Accusations of "liberal media" are sometimes
based on public opinion polls. For example see this
comment by blogger Dave Huber, on the right-wing weblog That Liberal
Media:
Poll after poll demonstrate that the public believes
the media tilt left, not right
(Of course, that's not the only spin point he offers
in the post. He also conveniently refers to the other hacktacular spin
point about
reporters' biases). But, for now, let's focus on the spin point of
public opinion on liberal media bias.
The Polling
Report's page is a good source for such opinion polls. Let's look
at the (roughly yearly) Gallup
polls from 9/01 through 9/04. If you take the Gallup poll numbers
literally (ignoring MoE for the moment, considering
conservatives themselves usually
cite the raw numbers without MoE), on average less than
50% of the public believes the media is biased "liberal".
On average, just over 50% of the public believes that the media
is either conservative or "about right" in its balance. So,
if you take these numbers seriously, we can conclude that:
-
Usually, the majority of the public does
not actually buy the argument that the media is liberal
-
The claim that "the public" tends
to believe that the media is "liberal" is yet
another favorite, conservative spin point (which focuses usually
on comparing "liberal bias" and "conservative
bias", leaving out those who don't see a specific bias)
-
This is the kind of insidious spin that
allows the Right's meme-pushers to keep propagating misleading
"liberal bias" claims into "news" and
opinions, which in turn misinform the public about what
the public itself believes
In fact, if you look at this
2004 "special report" by the right-wing Media
Research Center (MRC) - famous for making a living by misleading
or lying to the public - you see gratuitous spin and misleading
statements using similar opinion poll results. I have commented in
detail on the relevant portion of the MRC report at ICM Sec.
2.11A. When you read the report, you notice the section title
which says "The Public Recognizes the Media’s Liberal Bias",
followed by a set of opinion poll results where raw numbers on public
opinions on bias are presented (without MoE) and then,
statements like this:
The public is not wrong: news organizations are, in
fact, disproportionately liberal, and far too many reporters
approach their stories with a liberal mindset. Every study of the
past 25 years has proved this point. The only question is when will
the media elite recognize that a liberal bias erodes their
credibility with mainstream and conservative audiences, and make
ideological diversity in their newsrooms a goal?
Unless you are somewhat careful reading the report,
you don't realize that (if you set aside MoE, as they have) 2
out of 3 studies they show in the same page indicate that a minority
of Americans believe there is a "liberal bias" in the
media. (I'm actually being generous to MRC by dropping a fourth
example they have listed, that indirectly shows
pro-liberal-bias support below 50%). That is then being spun to
make a case for a pervasive problem of "liberal bias".
There is an important reason why groups like MRC
are successful - the MSM Illiberal
Conservative Media - which simply doesn't bother to call out these
guys as the pathetic hacks that they are.
But that's not all. There's a more serious problem
with the argument that "the media must be liberal-biased because
the public thinks it is."
This claim is probably the most laughable claim of all in the
media bias debate. The Right, after all, believes that the media
is too liberal and therefore tends to skew their reporting and
misinform the public. If they believe that the media's reporting
can skew public opinion, it would be hypocritical not to consider the
possibility that the public thinks the media is liberal because it is
being told repeatedly that the media is liberal, even if it
were not that liberal in reality. (Indeed, the MRC
"special report" discussed above is a living, breathing
example of this kind of garbage being fed to Americans.)
But this is not a problem just with the MRCs of the
world. Everyone knows this spoon-feeding is also facilitated by the MSM
ICM. As
Stanford University's Geoffrey Nunberg pointed out in the American
Prospect (bold text is my emphasis):
....none of the critics took on the single most
extraordinary result in the data I looked at -- this one
involving, not labeling, but the way the press talks about the bias
story itself. In the newspapers I looked at, the word
"media" appears within seven words of "liberal
bias" 469 times and within seven words of "conservative
bias" just 17 times -- a twenty-seven-fold discrepancy. (As
it happens, the disproportion is about the same in the database that
Boyd looked at -- 72 to 3).
Now there's a difference that truly deserves
to be called staggering. But how should we explain it? Certainly critics
on the left haven't been silent about what they take to be
conservative bias in the media, whether in the pages of
political reviews or in dozens of recent books. But the press has
given their charges virtually no attention, while giving huge play
to complaints from the right about liberal bias. That's hardly what
you'd expect from a press that really did have a decided liberal
bias, and in fact the discrepancy is far greater than anything you
could explain by supposing that reporters were merely bending over
backwards to be fair -- in that case, after all, you'd expect
them to give at least a polite nod to the other side, as well.
David Brock mentioned this very aspect in his seminal
book The
Republican Noise Machine:
[p 113] When challenged during his TV appearances,
Goldberg invariably replied that since so many Americans believe the
claim that the media is liberal, he couldn't be wrong. But as
Nunberg pointed out, this logic has a circular quality to it.
"In newspaper articles published since 1992, the word 'media'
appears within seven words of 'liberal bias' 469 times and within
seven words of 'conservative bias' just 17 times," he wrote.
"If people are disposed to believe that the media have a
liberal bias, it's because that's what the media have been telling
them all along."
In the end, this silly argument for "liberal
media" (using public opinion polls) does show one thing. People
who argue "liberal bias" based on such polls (rather than
the actual content/accuracy of news reports) show how deeply spin-loving,
unserious and wrong they are about this issue - which is
at the core of a democracy.
Having said that, there is no doubt that Progressives
in the country do face a problem. A substantial percentage of
the country believes that the media is biased "liberal"
because of the Republican Misinformation Machine (RMM) and the ICM.
If we look at the Gallup
poll results, even in 2002 and early 2003, a plurality (but
not a majority) felt that the media was "too liberal",
despite the fact that conservatives
and mainstream
media outlets have themselves acknowledged what we independently
know from their "news" coverage in that time period -
namely, that the media went soft on George Bush after 9/11 and before
the Iraq invasion, thereby acting as an uncritical carrier of
misleading and false Bush administration claims prior to the Iraq war.
This, in itself, tells you how the portion of the public that believes
there is a "liberal media" has been misled about the
media's tilt.
We need to fix that. This series and the ones that follow it, will
be my attempt to suggest a path to solve this problem.
Part 8: Using obvious, unintentional errors in news
reports
[Posted originally at The
Left Coaster]
How the Liberal Media Myth is Created - Part 8
This is a continuation of a series on how the "liberal
media" myth is created. |